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ABSTRACT 
Purpose  –  This  study  analyses  the  effects  on  productivity  of  Performance-Related 
Payments (PRP) and unions, and examines to what extent heterogeneity between firms 
characterises these influences.  
Design - For the Italian economy, the study presents firm-level quantile regressions for 
Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP)  and  controls  for  various  observed  characteristics  of 
firms, worker composition and labour relations.  
Findings - The paper shows the significant effect of PRP and unions on the whole 
economy and on firms operating in the manufacturing industries. In these industries, 
the uniform incentive effects of PRP but the increasing impact of unions are estimated 
along the productivity distribution. Conversely, the role of management - significant in 
all sectors- is more efficacious in prospering large firms operating in services.  
Research  limitations  –  The  adoption  of  PRP  schemes  and  the  presence  of  unions 
maybe endogenous to firms’ productivity, and our estimates do not prove causal links 
but simply suggest correlations. 
Practical  implications  -  The  limited  incentive  effects  of  PRP  schemes  in  services 
contribute towards explaining the slowdown in Italian productivity, whereas the role 
of unions is quite uniform among sectors. 
Originality-  The  paper  addresses  the  hitherto  poorly  developed  issue  of  firm 
heterogeneity and TFP, and offers the first Italian study of PRP and unions, which 
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Starting  from  the  early  1990s,  several  labour  market  reforms  have  been  enacted  in 
many European countries, to favour the ‘flexibility’ of industrial relations and to link 
wage  increases  to  the dynamics of labour productivity. The efficacy of this type of 
reform raises many unsolved issues (OECD, 2004; ch. 3).  
One theoretical question regards the positive expected results of wage flexibility and 
performance - related payments (PRP) on productivity, but also side - effects (negative), 
due to new opportunities for rent-sharing opened up by firm level agreements. The 
trade-off has already been pointed out by the German Mitbestimmung literature, which 
advocates separating factors determining firm outcome results from those related to 
their  distribution.  This  theme  has  engendered  new  interest  in  the  recent  empirical 
literature; it has shown that in two European economies, Germany (Gürtzgen, 2009) 
and Belgium (Rusinek and Rycx, 2008), the disadvantages of distributive, rent-sharing 
rules  overcome the positive effects of flexible wage structures. 
Another critical issue concerns the strategic role of complementary workplace practices 
which influence the actual impact of performance management systems. For instance, 
Black and Lynch (2001) found that, in the American economy, unionised plants,  where 
joint  decision-making  accompanies  incentive  pays,  show  higher  productivity 
performance than non-unionised establishments. The adoption of ‘high involvement’ 
systems is thus a necessary condition to making contingent pay settings effective on 
productivity  growth,  as  explored  by  growing  empirical  literature  (see  survey  by 
Godard and Delaney, 2000). 
Both fields of research indicate the existence of alternative reasons for expecting that 
links  between  productivity  and  wage  incentives  are  weaker  or  stronger.  This  is 
confirmed by micro - evidence revealing that disparities in efficiency gains may persist 
even among firms within a single country. Indeed, it is now widely recognised (after the 
contribution on trade of Melitz, 2003) that firms are heterogeneous with respect to key 
variables, including productivity and wage setting. The controversial impact of PRP 
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thus seems to find its natural place within the literature on heterogeneity. Nevertheless, 
there are few empirical studies for European countries on wage rules, productivity and 
heterogeneity (Wagner et al., 2004 for Germany; Bastos et al., 2009, for Portugal); there is 
no evidence for the Italian economy. 
The present work integrates these elements - the role of PRP and firms' heterogeneity- 
and makes a start at filling this gap. One additional point that motivates our analysis is 
that in Italy PRP systems differ across regions and sectors, and PRP firms show the 
higher presence of unions, as reported recently by Damiani and Ricci (2009)2. But is the 
divide between winners and losers also within sectors and regions? Do firms improve 
their  performance  differently  by  exploiting  or  not  exploiting  these  remuneration 
systems?  Is  the  overall  union  influence  on  productivity  more  pronounced  in  some 
group of firms? 
Other good reasons suggest that Italy is an interesting case study. In 1993, the country 
began a large-scale reform of its industrial relations system, aimed at providing more 
space to wage compensation related to efficiency gains. However, since the mid-1990s, 
Italian labour productivity growth started to record a significant slowdown. Also, as 
reported by Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2005), growth accounting revealed the crucial 
impact of the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), the component which cannot be due to 
capital deepening but to organisational strategies represented by innovation in human 
resources practices. An additional question is to what extent do firm heterogeneities in 
PRP practices and union action influence this aggregate effect?  
The present paper starts exploring these issues by using a unique dataset which collects 
firm-level information for both manufacturing and services sectors. This dataset, was 
obtained by merging longitudinal information on balance-sheet data from the AIDA 
archive for the period 2002-2005 and cross-sectional information on the adoption of 
PRP, and the presence of unions and other workplace characteristics from the ISFOL 
Employer-Employee (RIL) survey for 20053.   
The basic idea was to use a two-step estimation procedure, similar to that used by Black 
and Lynch (2001), and quantile regressions. In the first step, we estimate a classical 
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production function, using longitudinal data on balance-sheet variables for the period 
2002-2005. In the second step, we use quantile regression to estimate the influence of 
PRP,  unions  and  other  workplace  characteristics  on  the  distribution  of  the  average 
values of residuals, obtained in the first step. This allows us to analyse whether the role 
of some leading institutional factors, such as unions and PRP practices, changes greatly 
across the distribution of the firm-specific time-invariant component, i.e., across the 
distribution of TPF.  
In this context, we find two main results. First, the adoption of PRP exerts a positive 
effect on the TFP - more significant in manufacturing sectors, where efficiency gains 
associated with PRP are quite homogenous throughout the whole distribution. Second, 
the  presence  of  unions  has  a  positive  influence  on  firms'  unobserved  productivity 
across all quantiles, being significantly higher for best-performing firms (those placed 
at the highest quantile of the productivity distribution). These significant effects, found 
for  two  important  institutions  (PRP  and  worker  representations),  are  particularly 
meaningful  since  they  were  obtained  from  ample  coverage  and  including  all  size 
classes. 
Other  minor  results  which  deserve  further  research  are  the  effects  obtained  due  to 
worker  composition,  which  change  significantly  among  the  different  quantiles.  In 
particular,  we  found  a  negative  influence  exerted  by  the  share  of  women  on  TFP, 
although its estimated coefficient decreases significantly along the distribution, to the 
point of being statistically insignificant at the highest quantiles.  
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly discuss the theoretical and 
empirical literature. In Section 3, we present data and offer descriptive statistics. Section 
4 illustrates the econometric framework. Section 5 presents the estimation results, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Productivity, performance payments and unions: a short reappraisal   
 
Our research is related to various fields of theoretical and empirical literature. One field 
is  that  of  the  ‘employee  financial  participation’  literature,  which  advocates  that 
payments of collective bonuses such as profit-sharing schemes reveal a commitment 
device to motivate group of workers and their collaborative relationships. However, it 5 
 
has also points out that the collective nature of bonuses may induce employees to free-
ride on the efforts of others and thus cut productivity. In these circumstances, the best 
ways of overcoming free-riding and achieve peer pressure are participative employee 
practices  and  good-quality  employee-management  relationships,  as  shown  by  a 
growing body of empirical research (see, among others, Kruse et al., 2003). In any case, 
the net effects are encouraging: more than twenty country experiences offer a wide 
consensus on the positive or, at least, neutral effects on productivity, and empirical 
differences may be attributed “to differences in participatory practices in firms with 
profit-sharing plans” (Pérotin and Robinson, 2003, p. 22).4  
A  second  field  of  literature  emphasises  that  individual  bonuses  linked  to  firm 
performance  reveal  a  commitment  device  to  motivate  single  employees.  Incentive 
designs,  reviewed  by  Prendergast  (1999),  should  properly  minimise  risk-sharing 
properties, as well as magnify promotion of firm-specific human capital investments. 
This literature has also shown that the ‘power of incentives’, arises as the outcome of 
two  distinct  effects:  motivation  and  sorting.  Pay  settings  that  change  from  rewards 
based on input measures to payments related to output outcomes may induce dramatic 
improvements, and half the change is explained by the attraction of workers of higher 
ability  (Lazear,  2000).  Even  in  this  field,  which  focuses  on  individual  incentive 
agreements,  interactions  with  other  packages  of  good  workplace  practices,  have 
received greater attention and have given rise to many studies exploring nationally 
representative samples of enterprises (Black and Lynch, 2001) or insider econometric 
case  studies  from  within  firms  (Ichniowski  and  Shaw,  2003)  on  the    “value  of  the 
complementary role of human resource practices”.  
A third (fragmented) body of literature opens up a more problematic line of inquiry. 
Scepticism has been emphasised according to the market power approach. It has been 
argued that, in conditions of imperfect competition and high levels of unionisation, 
company wage agreements cause redistribution of rents as well as collusive behaviour 
between management and employees. Germany itself and its institutional architecture 
prove how influential this position has been, since collective bargaining is separated 
from all aspects of codetermination. Empirical support is offered by Hübler and Jirjahn 
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(2003) who found that, in German firms with uncovered industrial regimes negotiating 
compensations  at  company  level  with  their  unions,  rent-sharing  effects  were  more 
pronounced. 
The  role  of  collective  action  calls  attention  to  unions.  Much  of  the  literature  on 
unionism  still  adopts  the  “two  face  approach”  originated  by  Freeman  and  Medoff 
(1984).  The  good  face  implies  improvements  in  productivity,  decreases  in  earnings 
dispersion and greater space reserved for the workers’ voice, accompanied by a proper 
management response. The bad face is generated by the monopolistic bargaining power 
of workers’ representations, which lead to wage distortions, rent appropriations and 
decreases in productivity.  
On empirical grounds, the effects of unions on efficiency are not easily detectable - for 
various  reasons,  reviewed  by  Addison  and  Hirsch  (1989).  First,  union  productivity 
differentials may be overstated, since they result from a natural competitive process in 
which  less  productive  unionised  firms  are  simply  selected  out  from  the  system.  In 
addition, if unionised firms pay higher wages, the positive productivity effects may 
simply be due to a firm response in terms of employment contraction along the labour 
demand  schedule.  Conversely,  this  response  is  not  fully  supported  by  empirical 
studies:  evidence  shows  that  contractual  solutions  are  quite  often  reached  by  the 
efficient  bargaining  model,  not  by  the  wage-employment  negative  relation,  as 
theoretically hypothesised by McDonald and Solow (1981).  
Lastly, indirect (negative) effects are exerted by union action on profitability, which 
leads to lower investments and innovation activity, a long-term effect which short-term 
analyses, however, often fail to estimate (see various empirical studies discussed by 
Addison and Hirsch, 1989).   
The  specific  channels  through  which  productivity  growth  is  accelerated  or  slowed 
down may relate to their role in investments in human and physical capital. On one 
hand, it has been contended that unions have positive effects by enhancing job security, 
greater loyalty in employees and more investment in firm-specific skills, leading to 
higher efficiency growth. The rationale behind this thinking is that, when unions are 
absent,  employers  may  adopt  opportunistic  actions  with  respect  to  training, 
performance pay and promotions (Ricci and Waldman, 2006). On their part, employees 7 
 
withhold  effort  and  do  not  accumulate  firm-specific  human  capital  when  they 
anticipate opportunistic action in the form of low fixed minimum wages or promised 
promotions or promised training. On the other hand, the presence of unions, enforcing 
commitment and trust, prevents employers from reneging on informal and implicit 
agreements with their workforce, creates motivation, and enhances productivity.  
The opposite views emphasise the negative influence of unions (see ample discussion 
in Addison and Hirsch, 1989). Wage bargaining over quasi-rents from capital expenses 
causes lower returns for firms, hold-up behaviour and under-investments; a firm may 
face a credible threat of strike promoted by workers and their unions to appropriate 
part of these returns, and  in such circumstances, it reduces investments in tangible and 
intangible capital.  
In sum, the expected effects of unions on pay settings and productivity are ambiguous, 
and it is not surprising that international evidence shows contradictory findings. For 
instance, for the US, Black and Lynch (2001) estimate, that unionised establishments 
which adopt incentive—based compensations (associated with joint decision-making) 
have higher productivity than other similar non-union plants. For our case study, Italy, 
Origo  (2009)  reports  the  opposite:  for  the  metal-working  sector,  she  estimates  that 
productivity  gains  are  higher  within  low-unionised  firms,  whereas  high-unionised 
companies are more oriented to rent-sharing. 
We test these findings by means of our estimates in other sectors of the Italian economy 
and examine to what extent ambiguous outcomes are affected by firm heterogeneities. 
 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics  
 
Our  empirical  analysis  was  based  on  a  nationally  representative  sample  of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms, obtained by merging information from 
two different sources: balance-sheet data from the Bureau Van Dijk AIDA archive and 
firm-level information on performance-related pay and other workplace practices from 
the ISFOL Employer and Employee Survey (RIL).  
For 2005, the ISFOL-RIL survey collected cross-sectional information about personnel 
organisation,  recruitment  strategies,  position  of  employees,  training  investments, 
presence of unions, adoption of PRP schemes and other workplace characteristics. The 8 
 
RIL  survey  refers  to  firms  operating  in  the  non-agricultural  sector,  sampling  both 
partnership and limited companies, for a total sample of 21,728 firms.  
The AIDA database contains annual accounts for limited companies with turnover of 
over 100,000 Euros for 2004 (the turnover threshold was previously 500,000 Euros). This 
database is a source of information on sales, value added, capital, labour, and R&D for 
the period between 1997 and 2005.   
In order to link information concerning workers’ characteristics to indicators of firm 
performance and accounting variables, a sub-sample of the RIL dataset was merged 
with balance-sheet from the AIDA archive for a period of four years (2002-2005), using 
company  tax  codes.  Thus,  the  merged  RIL-AIDA  sample  exploits  cross-sectional 
information about employees’ participation and other workplace practice, for 2005, and 
the longitudinal structure of accounting data for the period 2002-2005. 
According to the characteristics of the RIL-AIDA dataset, the representativeness of the 
merged sample is reduced to limited companies. Also, we excluded firms with fewer 
than  five  employees.  This  filter  was  applied  to  identify  firms  characterised  by  a 
minimum level of organisational structure and internal labour market, and allows us to 
avoid all phenomena connected with self-employment, beyond the scope of the present 
paper. 
After matching and data validation, we obtained an unbalanced panel of 6160 firms. 
The sample coverage is  representative of the population of the Italian firms.  
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
In this section, we present descriptive statistics of the AIDA-RIL merged sample for the 
year 2005. Given the focus on the relationship between labour market institutions and 
firms'  heterogeneity,  we  distinguish  three  groups  of  firms,  according  to  their 
productivity performance over the period 2002-2005: ‘low performers’ fall in the group 
between the 1st and 25th percentiles of the average value-added distribution, ‘middle 
performers’ are the group of firms whose productivity falls between the 50th and 75th 
percentiles of the average value-added distribution, and ‘high performers’ are those 
firms with productivity higher than the 75th percentile.  9 
 
We then examine the main characteristics of these different groups of firms, as well as 
of  the  whole  sample.  As  regards  enterprise  characteristics,  we  examine  the  value 
added, fixed capital, a dummy variable indicating whether the firms compete in the 
international market, four dimensional classes (5-9, 10-49, 50-249, and more than 250 
employees), four geographical macro-areas (the North-West, North-East, Central and 
Southern regions of Italy) and seven 2-digit sectors5. Workers characteristics include the 
share  of  women,  the  professional  composition  of  employees  (managers  and 
supervisors,  white-collar  workers,  blue-collar  workers,  and  the  shares  of  fixed-term 
contracts and trained workers. For workplace characteristics we included two dummy 
variables  indicating  the  adoption  of  PRP  and  the  presence  of  unions  at  firm  level, 
respectively. We also take into account the local unemployment rate and the vacancy 
rate for each firm, with the main aim of controlling for labour market tightness. 
Table 1 lists the summary statistics for these variables. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
First, we consider a group of variables related to firm strategies: capital accumulation, 
internationalisation, and incentive wage settings. Our database clearly describes the 
overall picture which describes the typical profile of high-performer firms: they are 
more  active  in  terms  of  capital  accumulation,  more  frequently  represented  in 
international markets, and more oriented towards adopting  incentive pay systems. 
The  opposite  is  true  for  the  low  performers;  companies  in  the  intermediate 
quantiles of productivity growth also occupy an intermediate position in terms of 
capital  accumulation,  exposure  to  international  competition,  and  adoption  of 
performance-related payments.  
Second,  differences  were  also  shown  in  workforce  characteristics  between  firms 
ranked by productivity. As expected, over-achiever firms have more trained employees 
                                                 
5In particular, we group 2-digit sectors into six categories: 1)- Manufacturing (mining and quarrying; 
electricity, gas and water supply, manufacturing); 2)- Construction; 3)- Trade, hotels and restaurants; 
4)-  Transport  and  communication;  5)-  Financial  intermediation  and  other  business  services;  6)- 
Education, health and other public services 10 
 
and make less use of fixed-term contracts; they have also lower percentages of women 
on the staff. 
Third, the role of industrial relations is clearcut: over-performers show high levels of 
unionisation and higher labour market tightness (as shown by low local unemployment 
rates), but also fewer  recruitment problems in filling vacant jobs.  
Lastly, the ranking order of companies is probably influenced by other firm features, 
since the success of firms may also depend on specific internal conditions (size and 
sector) and external factors (geographical location). Table 2 sheds some lights on these 
issues. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 shows that regional gaps still persistent in terms of productivity performance, 
and the highest gains are recorded in the North-West, whereas North-Eastern regions 
do not show clear characterisation in terms of company success. One unambiguous 
result is obtained for the dimensional aspect, which reveals a clearcut element of firm 
efficiency, as shown by the highest incidence of high performers among large-sized 
firms.  
In addition, Table 2 reveals sectoral imbalances, showing diverging patterns between 
industrial and services sectors: the majority of under-achiever firms are in trade, hotels 
and restaurants (30% in the 1st quantile); the best performers are in manufacturing (55% 
of firms in the upper quantile). It should be noted that our findings are consistent with 
those  obtained  from  other  studies  which  have  analysed  the  performance  of  Italian 
companies  from  various  perspectives.  For  instance,  the  literature  on  internalisation 
shows that firms generating higher added value and higher productivity are also more 
exposed to international competition, are larger and employ more capital per workers 
(Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007).  Our summary statistics reveal that, across Italian firms, 
differences  in  size  are  related  to  productivity  performance  and,  with  sector 
specialisation,  contribute  towards  characterising  disparities  between  successful  and 
unsuccessful Italian firms. This result is consistent with that of Pagano and Schivardi 
(2003), who show that size (through its influence on innovation activity) is important 
for  growth  and  plays  a  role  in  cross-country  comparisons  for  European  countries, 
including Italy.  11 
 
 
4.  The econometric framework 
The  econometric  strategy  used  to  analyse  the  relation  between  PRP  and  firm 
productivity  is  based  on  a  two-step  estimation  procedure  and  quantile  regression 
methods.  
The two-step procedure is similar to that used by Black and Lynch (2001) and allows us 
to  exploit  the  specific  structure  of  the  AIDA-RIL  merged  sample,  where  each  firm 
presents longitudinal information on balance-sheet variables for the period 2002-2005 
and cross-sectional information on PRP adoption and other workplace characteristics 
for 2005. In the first step, panel data methods are used to estimate the parameters of 
time-variant  input  factors  (i.e.,  capital  and  labour)  of  a  classical  Cobb-Douglas 
production  function.  The  quantile  regression  method  is  used  in  the  second  step  to 
estimate the impact of PRP and other workplace characteristics (obtained from the 2005 
RIL survey) over the whole distribution of firm-specific fixed effects estimated in the first 
step6.  
The coefficients of the production function can be estimated consistently with the fixed-
effect  estimator.  However,  the  within-estimator  tends  to  go  too  far  in  discarding 
potentially  valuable  cross-sectional  information,  because  the  influence  of  observed 
(almost) time-invariant factors, such as the industry sector, PRP, and other quasi-fixed 
variables in the production function cannot be identified, or measurement errors may 
explain a large part of their variance (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Griliches 
and Mairasse, 1995, Dearden, Read and Van Reenen, 2000). This feature proves to be a 
crucial hindrance in our case, because we only know whether or not an establishment 
adopted PRP in 2005 and this institutional variable does not change much over time. As 
PRP is treated as a quasi-fixed variable, we assume that firms which adopted PRP in 
2005 also adopted a PRP scheme before and after that year. 
                                                 
6The quantile regression method offers significant advantages over the least- squares method when 
the influence of PRP varies significantly across the distribution of firm productivity. This happens, 
for example, when unobserved firm heterogeneities in terms of management quality and norms of 
industrial relations map the observed distribution of firm productivity.  Quantile estimates are also 
robust relative to least-squares estimates when significant heterogeneity occurs, because they assign 
less weight to outliers and are robust to departures from normality. 12 
 
The two-step procedure is described below. 
In the first step, we estimate a classical Cobb-Douglas production function with two 
input factors, capital and labour. The following specification is thus used: 
 
(1)    it i t it it it a T L K Y ε β α + + + + = ln ln ln     for i=1,…,6160 ;  t=2002,..2005 
where  it Y  is the value added of firm i at time t,  it K  is physical capital,  it L  the number of 
employees, Tt the year dummies, to control for the business cycle,  i a  the unobserved 
firm-specific  fixed  effect,  and  it ε   the  idiosyncratic  error  term.  Then  equation  (1)  is 
estimated with a within-estimator.  
On the basis of these first-step estimates, for each firm we calculate the average of 
estimated fixed effect  i a  in the period 2002-2005, in order to obtain an estimate of the 
establishment-specific  fixed  component  over  the  observed  period.  Then,  the 
distribution of this component is regressed over the establishment variables, which are 
quasi time-invariant, and employment characteristics collected by the 2005 RIL survey.  
In particular, the second-step estimation is performed with quantile regressions over 
the following equation: 
 
  (2)        i i i i i u X U PRP a + + + = θ θ θ η α δ ˆ  
where i=1,…N is the number of observations in 2005, θ  the th-quantile being analysed, 
i a ˆ  the estimate of unobserved firm fixed effects obtained from the first step (equation 
1), PRP and U are dummy variables indicating respectively the  presence of PRP and 
unions  at  firm  level,  and  X  is  a  vector  of  other  control  variables7.  The  vector  of 
coefficients  θ δ , 
'
θ α  and  θ η  are estimated at the selected quantile; the idiosyncratic error 
term,  i u , is such that  0 ) , , | ( = X U PRP u Q i θ 8.   
                                                 
7The other control variables included in the baseline specification of equation (2) are the same as 
those  previously  used  for  descriptive  statistics:  the  share of women, professional composition of 
employees, shares of fixed-term and trained workers, vacancy rate, and local rate of unemployment, 
a dummy variable indicating whether the firm sells its products abroad, four dummies for  firm size, 
four dummies for geographical macro-areas, and six aggregated 2-digit sectors. 
8For a detailed discussion on methodological issues and techniques used to perform point and interval 
inferences, see Koenker and Basset (1978) and Buchinsky (1994). 13 
 
In our framework, coefficients  θ δ  and 
'
θ α  capture the quantile treatment effect of PRP and 
union  presence  across  the  distribution  of  the  estimated  firm-specific  unobserved 
heterogeneity.  By  verifying  whether  estimated  coefficients 
'
θ δ  
'
θ α   differ  across  the 
quantile  distribution  of  i a ˆ ,  we  then  can  infer  how  these  labour  market  institutions 
affect firms' unobserved fixed components. 
It is worth noting that fixed effects,  estimated in the first step, can be interpreted as 
average  firm-specific  differences  to  productivity  predicted  on  the  basis  of  variable 
inputs - in other words, the TFP. Therefore, the estimated fixed effects for the period 
2002-2005 indicate whether firms’ TFP was below or above the average of other firms 
during the observation period. Hence, with quantile regressions, we can infer whether 
the key variables have differential influences across the distribution of the average TFP. 
It should be emphasised that our two-step approach does not take into account any 
endogeneity at the second-step: firms' decisions to adopt PRP or the presence of unions 
may be related to productivity performance. The occurrence of such reverse causality 
may  generate  biased  estimates  of  quantile  regressions,  and  we  interpret  the 
econometric  results  as  simple  correlations  between  the  unexplained  part  of 
productivity and labour market institutions9. 
 
5.  Estimation results 
This section presents the main econometric results. As mentioned above, the first step 
consists of estimating equation (1) for the unbalanced panel of firms sampled for the 
period 2002-2005 with a within-estimator.10 In the second step, quantile regressions are 
applied to equation (2) to measure the influence of PRP and unions at different points 
of the firm-specific fixed effect distribution, i.e., at the 0.10th , 0.25th, 0.50th, 0.75th and 
0.90th quantiles.   
                                                 
9 The existence of a virtuous cycle between PRP, unions and firms' productivity was explicitly 
verified in a previous work (Damiani and Ricci, 2009).  
10For the purpose of estimation, value added and fixed capital have been deflated, respectively, by 
the  value  added  and  fixed  investment  deflators  at  2-digit  sectoral  level,  gathered  from  national 
accounts  provided by ISTAT (Italian Institute of Statistics). 14 
 
Table 3 shows the results. Columns 1-2 of Table 3 list the estimated coefficients of the 
production  function  (1).  Note  that  the  first-step  estimates  of  the  fixed  capital  and 
number of employees have the expected signs and high statistical significance. We do 
not comment further on these results.   
Our  focus  is  on  the  OLS  and  quantile  estimates  for  the  second-step  regressions 
(columns 3-11 of Table 3).  
[Table 3 about here] 
Among the main results, we point out that the estimates of PRP and unions are positive 
and statistically significant (error level of 1%) across the whole distribution. 
The positive and significant coefficient of PRP wage contracts confirms the theoretical 
assumptions advanced in Section 2. Incentives increase the efficiency of establishments 
and our findings follow other results in the Italian case: financial participation schemes 
give rise to significant gains in productivity (Biagioli and Curatolo, 1999; Amisano and 
Del Boca, 2004). 
The positive and significant role of unions is also remarkable: one interpretation is that 
PRP are more effective as incentive devices when they are promoted in environments 
characterised  by  cooperative  behaviour,  which  minimises  free-riding  and  promotes 
collaborative attitudes. However, the point estimates of PRP are quite uniform across 
the  distribution,  ranging  from  0.17  at  the  10th  and  75th  quantiles  to  0.22  at  the  90th 
quantile. 
Conversely, the positive influence of the union dummy variable increases significantly 
at the highest quantiles, being 0.24 in the 1st and 0.30 in the 75th and 90th quantiles11. 
These results may be explained by arguing, as suggested by Addison and Hirsch (1989, 
p.  76),  that  “union  and  non-union  establishments  may  differ  systematically  in  the 
quality of unmeasured organizational factors, so that firm effects are not independent of 
union status. For example, inputs such as managerial supervision and the quality of 
labor relations may be correlated with unionism, and omission of these factors may bias 
                                                 
11The  null  hypothesis  that  the  estimates  are  equal  between  pair-wise  quantiles  (and  across  all 
quantiles) is tested by the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients of the system of quantile 
regressions. Consequently, the null hypothesis about the union dummy variable is rejected at the 
conventional level of significance for the 0.10 vs 0.90 quantiles; conversely, the null hypothesis of 
equality of the coefficient of the PRP variable is accepted across the entire distribution. 15 
 
the  union  coefficient”.  Our  additional  estimates,  by  sector  allow  checking  whether 
unions generate pervasive and homogenous effects in the Italian economy. 
As  for  the  other  results,  the  strong  negative  influence  associated  with  the  share  of 
women should be noted, with a decreasing pattern along the distribution, which varies 
from -0.48 at the 10th quantile to +0.19 at the 90th quantile. This finding reveals that the 
proportion of women penalises the unexplained component of productivity, especially 
for under-performer firms, being lower at the highest quantile. It is also related to wage 
discrimination against women in the labour market, as other studies have found, and 
confirms  that,  in  Italy,  the  (unexplained)  gender  wage  gap  is  lower  at  the  highest 
quantile of the wage distribution (Naticchioni and Ricci, 2009).  
Table 3 also shows other findings which concern workers characteristics, such as those 
due to employment positions: the white- and blue-collar component has a negative 
influence with respect to the omitted category (managers and supervisors), mainly at 
the  highest  quantiles.  The  positive  influence  of  managerial  and  male  personnel 
confirms  that  job  positions  play  a  significant  role,  especially  for  firms  with  better 
performance:  managers  and  executives  have  a  positive  influence  on  productivity. 
Among other factors, this may be due to their role in providing better-designed pay 
schemes, to induce optimal effort from their subordinates.  
As  regards  other  workforce  characteristics,  an  interesting  result  is  the  negative 
influence of fixed-term workers across the whole distribution, with a magnitude that 
decreases at higher quantiles and becomes statistically insignificant at the 90th quantile. 
Conversely, the estimated coefficient of trained workers is positive, but is significant at 
1% only at the median value of the distribution.  
Lastly,  our  estimates  confirm  that  the  size  and  geographical  location  of  firms  are 
important determinants of their efficiency. The positive relationship between firm size 
and  unexplained  productivity  is  significant  at  all  quantiles  analysed.  As  expected, 
regional  gaps  highlight  the  worst  productivity  performance  of  Southern  firms  (the 16 
 
omitted  category),  although  the  estimates  do  not  show  a  clear  pattern  across  the 
distribution12. 
 
6. Robustness checks: manufacturing and services sectors 
The  role  of  firm  and  sectoral  disparities  are  examined  in  this  section.  To  ascertain 
whether  the  relationship  between  labour  institutions  and  the  unobserved  part  of 
productivity  depends  on  firm  sectoral  specialisation,  we  replicated  the  preceding 
analysis  for  the  manufacturing  and  services  sectors,  separately13.  The  econometric 
strategy and estimation methods are the same as those used for the whole economy, 
and do not require further explanation.  
Table 4 displays the results for manufacturing. The second-step estimates confirm the 
positive and significant effects of PRP and unions across all quantiles. However, the 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for both variables are higher than those found 
for the whole economy, and are quite uniform across all quantiles.  
The  magnitude  of  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  women‘s  share  is  stronger  in 
manufacturing, and decreases significantly at higher quantiles, not being statistically 
significant for under-performer manufacturing firms.  
The  professional  composition  of  the  workforce  reveals  no  clear  interpretation:  the 
coefficients associated with the share of blue-  and white-collar workers are positive at 
the 10th quantile and negative at the 75th quantile, but are not statistically significant at 
other  quantiles.  Trained  workers  have  a  positive  influence  across  the  whole 
distribution, except at the 90th quantile. Conversely, the share of fixed-term workers has 
a negative effect on the unexplained productivity component, mainly at the 75th and 
90th quantiles.  
The roles played by firm size and geographical location in the manufacturing sectors 
are similar to those found for the rest of the economy: there is a positive relationship 
                                                 
12Given  our  focus  on  institutions,  we  do  not  comment  on  other  significant  estimates  of  quantile 
regressions:  the  positive  role  exerted  by  firms  which  compete  on  international  markets,  and  the 
negative impact of the vacancy rate variable. Both results deserve future study.  
13 In particular, the manufacturing sector includes: mining and quarrying; electricity, gas and water 
supply;  manufacturing;  construction.  The  service  sector  includes:  trade,  hotels  and  restaurants; 
transport  and  communication;  financial  intermediation  and  other  business  services;  education, 
health, and other public services. 17 
 
between  size  and  location  in  Northern  regions  and  unobserved  productivity  at  all 
quantiles of the distribution. 
Concerning  the  services  sector  (Table  5),  the  main  difference  with  respect  to  the 
manufacturing sector is that the positive effect of PRP holds only at the 25th and 50th 
quantiles.14. Our estimates thus signal that productivity enhancements, due to PRP, are 
more questionable and reveal a remarkable gap between industries. The insignificant 
effect of PRP on productivity in the private tertiary sector is particularly meaningful, 
and  is  a  critical  aspect  for  this  labour-intensive  sector,  where  promotion  of 
organisational and motivational innovation is expected to enhance TFP productivity 
growth.  
Conversely, the union dummy variable continues to be positive and significant across 
the entire distribution, with a higher influence at the 75th and 90th quantiles (around 
0.30). 
In addition, the negative effect of women’s share in services is significant and decreases 
across quantiles, although its magnitude is lower than that found in manufacturing. 
Interestingly, trained workers play no significant role, whereas the share of fixed-term 
workers is detrimental at all quantiles of the distribution.   
For  under-performer  companies,  we  also  found  that  occupational  categories  with 
respect to managerial and supervisory staff (the omitted group) have a negative and 
significant  effect,  higher  than  that  in  firms  characterised  by  low  and  medium 
productivity increases. This last finding also suggests that management counts more in 
a sector like the tertiary, where production processes are the results of the intangible 
competences of human capital15.  
Lastly, size and location in Northern regions also favour productivity growth in the 
services sector, as found for manufacturing. One probable reason behind the role of size 
is that larger firms are expected to be associated with superior managerial competence, 
                                                 
14Damiani and Ricci (2009) already showed the limited diffusion of PRP contracts which are only 
adopted in a small number of firms in services. The present work complements these findings by 
showing the moderate efficacy of wage premiums granted in this sector, a result which appears 
near-universal, being  a common feature for all groups of firms in the private tertiary sector. 
15In another study, on Italian manufacturing firms, Piva, Santarelli and Vivarelli (2005) showed that 
organisational improvements, combined with technological innovation, jointly affect the demand for 
labour and skill composition, proxied by white- and blue-collar shares. 18 
 
an  omitted  variable  which  is  caught  by  the  dimensional  feature.  Indeed,  the  best 
performers  (represented  by  larger  firms)  can  afford  costly  strategies  such  as  the 
upgrading  of  management:  this  leads  to  implementation  of  better  practices,  which 
allow  them  to  enjoy  greater  efficiency  results.  In  addition,  in  large  companies, 
economies  of  scale  reduce  implementation  costs  per  employee  and  explain  why 
benefits are expected to exceed costs.  
Our  results,  in  any  case,  call  for  further  investigation  of  the  importance  of  the 
competences  of  mangers  in  establishing  a  climate  of  successful  cooperation  with 
workers  and  their  representatives.  Thus,  complementary  factors  -interactions  of 
participation  and  high  performance  work  practices-  would  allow  us  to  verify  the 
importance of the ‘high commitment’ alternative, according to which employers seek to 
obtain competitive advantages with quality, worker participation and involvement, as 





Efficiency is expected to be higher when more incentives - in terms of wage premiums - 
are offered. This expectation is confirmed from our estimates, which show the positive 
and significant role of PRP agreements for the whole economy. However, our research 
also  finds  a  considerable  gap  between  sectors:  higher  significant  effects  of  wage 
agreements are found for firms operating in manufacturing industries, uniform along 
the whole productivity distribution; for services, no significant influences are obtained 
for  any  groups  of  firms.  Rent-sharing  and  limited  implementation  of  systems  of 
complementary human resources practices thus partly explain the slowdown in Italian 
productivity, mainly due to the poor performance of private services. 
Other main findings concern the positive and significant role of a second important 
institutional  factor  -  the  presence  of  unions.  For  this  variable  too,  estimates for the 
whole economy show that significant differences do exist between firms: unions and, 
plausibly, collective bargaining, which minimise free-riding behaviour and promote 
cooperative attitudes, are revealed as more powerful in over-achiever firms.  19 
 
Other heterogeneities concern innovative management and best work practices. These 
practices, costly to design and implement are significant in all sectors and groups of 
firms, but more efficacious in prospering large enterprises operating in the services 
sector, where organisational issues play a greater role. One suggested interpretation, 
which  should  be  thoroughly  explored,  is  that  different  channels,  management-led 
initiatives, and employee representations, often stigmatised as opposite paradigms in 
the relevant literature (Godard and Delaney, 2000), both occur  in Italy, but in distinct 
sectors and groups of firms.  
Another robust finding refers to the role of women’ s share on efficiency growth - 
negative in all sectors, but absent in over-achiever firms -  a puzzling result that 
should be better investigated. 
The main limitation of our study concerns the possible endogeneity of institutions and 
human resources management, perhaps due to firm productivity.  
Future research will aim at exploring this issue by exploiting the second wave of the 
RIL  survey,  which  allows  longitudinal  tracking  of  the  adoption  of  PRP  and  the 
presence of unions at firm level. In this perspective, it should also evaluate whether 
employee financial participation turns out to be a superior strategy for those groups of 
unionised  Italian  companies  which  better  exploit  the  participatory  content  of  these 
practices. Further research may be an additional step in detecting the reasons behind 
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Table 1: Statistics by firm performance - year 2005 
 













Mean  St. D 
 Av.(log) value added 2002-2005              8,38  1,30 
Av.(log)  fixed capital 2002-2005   6,26  1,61  7,85  1,53  10,19  1,56  7,37  1,95 
PRP  0,01  0,09  0,06  0,23  0,38  0,48  0,06  0,24 
Union   0,04  0,21  0,16  0,37  0,62  0,49  0,15  0,36 
% Women   0,49  0,31  0,33  0,26  0,31  0,22  0,40  0,29 
% Managers   0,13  0,18  0,06  0,11  0,09  0,11  0,09  0,14 
% White-collar workers  0,47  0,32  0,45  0,31  0,47  0,28  0,46  0,31 
% Blue-collar workers  0,41  0,32  0,48  0,31  0,44  0,30  0,45  0,31 
% Trained workers  0,13  0,28  0,18  0,30  0,22  0,29  0,16  0,29 
% Fixed-term contracts  0,15  0,18  0,10  0,14  0,09  0,12  0,12  0,16 
Foreign  0,29  0,45  0,40  0,49  0,63  0,48  0,37  0,48 
Unempl. rate (2004)  7,43  5,08  6,48  4,45  6,05  4,26  6,85  4,75 
Vacancy rate  0,11  0,16  0,05  0,10  0,02  0,04  0,08  0,13 
                          
Obs.  1388  3180  1592  6160 
 
 
Table 2: Statistics by firm performance- year 2005 
 










Mean  St. D.  Mean  St. D 
Firm size                 
  < 10 employees  0,66  0,47  0,14  0,35  0,01  0,12  0,35  0,48 
 10-49 employees  0,34  0,47  0,80  0,40  0,27  0,44  0,55  0,50 
 50-249 employees  0,00  0,04  0,05  0,23  0,58  0,49  0,08  0,27 
 >= 250 employees  0,00  0,02  0,00  0,05  0,14  0,35  0,01  0,12 
Macro-region                 
North-West  0,32  0,47  0,38  0,49  0,43  0,50  0,36  0,48 
North-East  0,19  0,39  0,25  0,43  0,27  0,44  0,22  0,42 
Centre  0,24  0,43  0,19  0,39  0,17  0,37  0,21  0,41 
South  0,24  0,43  0,18  0,38  0,13  0,34  0,20  0,40 
Sector                 
Manufacturing   0,27  0,44  0,43  0,49  0,55  0,50  0,37  0,48 
Construction  0,17  0,38  0,19  0,39  0,04  0,20  0,17  0,37 
Trade and Restaurant  0,30  0,46  0,21  0,41  0,17  0,37  0,25  0,43 
Transport and Telecom.  0,03  0,18  0,05  0,22  0,10  0,30  0,05  0,21 
Fin. Interm.,Business services  0,17  0,38  0,09  0,29  0,10  0,30  0,12  0,33 
Educ., Health, other Public Services  0,05  0,23  0,03  0,18  0,05  0,21  0,04  0,20 
                       




Table 3: Two-step estimates- whole economy 
Dep.  Variable q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
coeff.  st. er coeff. st. er coeff st.er. coef st.er. coef err. coef. st.er coef. st.er.
Log(fixed capital) 0,12 * 0,01
Log (employees) 0,24 * 0,01
Year dummies
constant 7,64 * 0,05 -1,13 * 0,12 -2,73 * 0,24 -1,6 * 0,13 -1,13 * 0,13 -0,29 *** 0,18 0,64 ** 0,31
PRP 0,20 * 0,03 0,17 * 0,04 0,19 * 0,03 0,20 * 0,03 0,17 * 0,04 0,22 * 0,06
Union  0,26 * 0,03 0,24 * 0,04 0,27 * 0,03 0,25 * 0,03 0,30 * 0,03 0,30 * 0,05
% Women  -0,34 * 0,04 -0,48 * 0,06 -0,4 * 0,03 -0,35 * 0,03 -0,26 * 0,05 -0,19 * 0,07
% White - collar workers -0,13 0,10 0,93 * 0,20 0,20 *** 0,12 -0,19 *** 0,10 -0,62 * 0,16 -1,30 * 0,28
% Blue - collar workers -0,18 *** 0,10 0,92 * 0,20 0,16 0,12 -0,22 ** 0,10 -0,70 * 0,15 -1,37 * 0,28
% Trained workers  0,06 ** 0,03 0,13 ** 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,09 * 0,03 0,09 ** 0,04 0,04 0,05
% Fixed- term contracts -0,43 * 0,07 -0,78 * 0,14 -0,5 * 0,08 -0,28 * 0,06 -0,21 * 0,08 -0,14 0,13
Foreign 0,09 * 0,02 0,12 * 0,04 0,06 *** 0,02 0,10 * 0,02 0,08 * 0,03 0,08 ** 0,04
unempl. 2004 0,01 * 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 * 0,01 0,01 *** 0,01 0,01 0,01
vacancy rate -0,56 * 0,10 -1,05 * 0,23 -0,6 * 0,14 -0,45 * 0,11 -0,35 * 0,12 -0,34 ** 0,18
North-West 0,47 * 0,05 0,45 * 0,11 0,39 * 0,06 0,48 * 0,05 0,38 * 0,07 0,35 * 0,09
North.East 0,40 * 0,05 0,44 * 0,11 0,33 * 0,06 0,41 * 0,05 0,31 * 0,07 0,23 ** 0,10
Centre 0,37 * 0,05 0,34 * 0,09 0,28 * 0,05 0,36 * 0,05 0,27 * 0,06 0,29 * 0,09
 10-49 employees 0,59 * 0,02 0,56 * 0,05 0,56 * 0,03 0,56 * 0,02 0,63 * 0,03 0,65 * 0,05
 50-249 employees 1,53 * 0,03 1,45 * 0,06 1,41 * 0,04 1,48 * 0,04 1,58 * 0,04 1,61 * 0,08
> 250 employees 2,31 * 0,05 2,14 * 0,10 2,28 * 0,07 2,39 * 0,04 2,46 * 0,06 2,41 * 0,10
Sector dummies
N. of firms 8604
Pseudo R-squared
Note: omitted category: managers, firms with less than 10 employees, South;  * significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
In quantile regression , bootstrapped errors with 200 replications
ols Log (v.a.)
Second Step First Step
(Yes) (Yes)
6060
0,592 0,3162 0,3566 0,4051 0,4326 0,4236
          (Yes)















Table 4: Two–step estimates, manufacturing industries 
Dep.  Variable
coeff.  st. er coeff. st. er coeff st.er. coef st.er. coef err. coef. st.er coef. st.er.
log(fixed capital) 0,13 * 0,01
log (employees) 0,29 * 0,01
Year dummies
constant 7,38 * 0,08 -1,25 * 0,17 -2,60 * 0,33 -1,74 * 0,19 -1,29 * 0,25 -0,68 *** 0,25 0,02 ** 0,39
PRP 0,23 * 0,04 0,22 * 0,05 0,20 * 0,04 0,25 * 0,03 0,21 * 0,05 0,29 * 0,08
union  0,26 * 0,03 0,23 * 0,05 0,27 * 0,03 0,25 * 0,04 0,31 * 0,05 0,29 * 0,06
% females -0,31 * 0,05 -0,60 * 0,10 -0,38 * 0,05 -0,32 * 0,06 -0,17 * 0,06 -0,10 0,10
% white collars 0,03 0,15 0,76 * 0,26 0,22 0,16 -0,05 0,17 -0,34 * 0,20 -0,56 0,36
% blue collars -0,03 0,14 0,73 * 0,27 0,23 0,15 -0,08 0,17 -0,47 * 0,19 -0,70 ** 0,35
% trained 0,13 * 0,04 0,18 * 0,04 0,11 * 0,04 0,15 ** 0,05 0,19 ** 0,05 0,09 0,07
% fixed term  -0,22 ** 0,09 -0,35 0,23 -0,35 * 0,13 -0,02 0,10 -0,16 * 0,11 -0,35 ** 0,19
foreign 0,09 * 0,03 0,23 * 0,05 0,09 0,03 0,09 * 0,03 0,05 * 0,04 -0,01 0,04
unempl. 2004 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 *** 0,01 0,00 0,01
vacancy rate -0,42 * 0,15 -1,30 * 0,33 -0,57 * 0,21 -0,15 0,17 -0,13 * 0,19 -0,08 0,24
North-West 0,32 * 0,07 0,37 ** 0,12 0,32 * 0,07 0,35 * 0,10 0,29 * 0,14 0,18 ** 0,10
North.East 0,27 * 0,07 0,31 ** 0,14 0,22 * 0,08 0,28 * 0,11 0,25 * 0,14 0,12 0,11
Centre 0,23 * 0,06 0,25 * 0,12 0,17 * 0,07 0,22 ** 0,09 0,17 * 0,12 0,06 0,10
 10-49 employees 0,52 * 0,03 0,53 * 0,05 0,56 * 0,04 0,58 * 0,03 0,64 * 0,04 0,66 * 0,06
 50-249 employees 1,33 * 0,05 1,35 * 0,07 1,39 * 0,05 1,51 * 0,05 1,58 * 0,06 1,67 * 0,09
> 250 employees 2,10 * 0,07 2,11 * 0,11 2,34 * 0,10 2,42 * 0,08 2,50 * 0,07 2,59 * 0,12
N. of firms 3856
Pseudo R-squared 0,4051 0,4326 0,4236
Note: omitted category: managers, firms with less than 10 employees, South;  * significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
In quantile regression , bootstrapped errors with 200 replications
          (Yes)
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0,6365 0,3162 0,3566
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Table 5: Two–step estimates, services sectors  
Dep.  Variable
coeff.  st. er coeff. st. er coeff st.er. coef st.er. coef err. coef. st.er coef. st.er.
Log(fixed capital) 0,116 * 0,007
Log (employees) 0,208 * 0,009
Year dummies
Constant 7,768 * 0,062 -1,19 * 0,16 -2,74 * 0,36 -1,65 * 0,18 -1,16 * 0,16 -0,46 *** 0,24 0,65 *** 0,37
PRP 0,12 ** 0,05 0,12 0,08 0,17 * 0,05 0,13 * 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,08 0,10
Union  0,25 * 0,04 0,25 * 0,05 0,24 * 0,05 0,24 * 0,04 0,31 * 0,04 0,30 * 0,08
% females -0,39 * 0,04 -0,51 * 0,07 -0,49 * 0,05 -0,36 * 0,04 -0,25 * 0,06 -0,24 * 0,09
% White-collar workers  -0,24 *** 0,13 0,98 * 0,28 0,17 0,15 -0,22 *** 0,14 -0,70 * 0,20 -1,46 * 0,33
% Blue-collar workers -0,28 ** 0,13 0,96 * 0,27 0,12 0,15 -0,25 *** 0,14 -0,77 * 0,19 -1,52 * 0,32
% Trained workers  -0,01 0,04 0,07 0,07 -0,02 0,04 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,04 -0,02 0,07
% Fixed-term contracts  -0,53 * 0,09 -1,06 * 0,21 -0,62 * 0,09 -0,45 * 0,09 -0,26 ** 0,11 -0,11 0,16
Foreign 0,12 * 0,03 0,13 * 0,05 0,03 0,03 0,12 * 0,03 0,12 * 0,04 0,21 * 0,06
Unempl. 2004 0,02 * 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 * 0,01 0,02 * 0,01 0,02 *** 0,01
Vacancy rate -0,66 * 0,13 -0,94 * 0,30 -0,71 * 0,19 -0,58 * 0,11 -0,53 * 0,17 -0,54 * 0,22
North-West 0,59 * 0,07 0,39 * 0,15 0,46 * 0,08 0,55 * 0,07 0,55 * 0,10 0,56 * 0,14
North.East 0,50 * 0,08 0,43 * 0,15 0,40 * 0,09 0,44 * 0,08 0,44 * 0,11 0,37 * 0,14
Centre 0,48 * 0,07 0,35 * 0,13 0,36 * 0,07 0,41 * 0,07 0,43 * 0,09 0,44 * 0,11
 10-49 employees 0,64 * 0,03 0,61 * 0,07 0,58 * 0,04 0,59 * 0,03 0,66 * 0,05 0,67 * 0,06
 50-249 employees 1,65 * 0,05 1,57 * 0,07 1,53 * 0,06 1,58 * 0,05 1,66 * 0,06 1,70 * 0,09
> 250 employees 2,42 * 0,07 2,14 * 0,13 2,37 * 0,11 2,53 * 0,07 2,51 * 0,08 2,41 * 0,12
N. of obs. 12756
N. of firms 4748
Pseudo R-squared 0,3647 0,3922 0,3851
Note: omitted category: managers, firms with less than 10 employees, South;  * significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%
In quantile regression , bootstrapped errors with 200 replications
          (Yes)
3276
0,6365 0,286 0,3197
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